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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 It has been said that the best defense is a good offense. 
True to that adage, Sherwin-Williams Company sued several 
Pennsylvania counties to forestall lead-paint litigation those 
counties seemed poised to file with the assistance of outside 
counsel motivated by a contingent-fee agreement. The District 
Court dismissed Sherwin-Williams’s complaint for lack of 




Sherwin-Williams is an Ohio corporation that 
manufactures and distributes paint. In Pennsylvania, the 
company employs nearly 2,000 people in 200 stores, offices, 
manufacturing plants, and a research and development facility. 
In 2018, Lehigh and Montgomery Counties sued 
Sherwin-Williams (and others) in state court over its 
manufacture and sale of lead-based paint. The counties pleaded 
a public nuisance theory of liability and sought abatement of 
the nuisance caused by lead-based paint, an order enjoining 
“future illicit conduct” by Sherwin-Williams, and a declaration 
acknowledging the existence of a public nuisance and 
Sherwin-Williams’s contribution to it. App. 273–74 (Lehigh 
County complaint); App. 119–21 (Montgomery County 
complaint). Both counties hired the same law firm on a 
contingency. Anticipating the same treatment from other 
counties, Sherwin-Williams went on the offensive. It sued 
Delaware, Erie, and York Counties, members of each county 
council, and “John Doe Counties” and “John Does” in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania to try to prevent them from suing or hiring 
outside contingent-fee counsel. App. 22–23. When Erie and 
York Counties responded by stating they would not sue or hire 
outside counsel, Sherwin-Williams dismissed its claims 
against them and their councilmembers. So this appeal 
concerns only Delaware County and its councilmembers. 
In its complaint, Sherwin-Williams alleged Delaware 
County “retained or [is] in the process of retaining counsel and 
intend[s] to sue Sherwin-Williams in various courts throughout 
Pennsylvania to pay for the inspection and abatement of lead 
paint in or on private housing and publicly owned buildings 
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and properties, including federal buildings and properties.” 
App. 26 ¶ 1. It claimed the County, by merely filing suit, will 
violate its constitutional rights. Sherwin-Williams also alleged 
“[i]t is likely that the fee agreement between [Delaware 
County] and the outside trial lawyers [is] or will be 
substantively similar to an agreement struck by the same 
attorneys and Lehigh County to pursue what appears to be 
identical litigation.” App. 47 ¶ 65. And it asserted that, by 
forming (or planning to form) this agreement with outside 
counsel, “the Count[y] ha[s] effectively and impermissibly 
delegated [its] exercise of police power to the private trial 
attorneys.” Id. Based on these allegations, Sherwin-Williams 
raised three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
In Count I, the company pleaded a First Amendment 
violation, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. It asked the 
District Court to prevent the County from trying to hold 
Sherwin-Williams liable for “(i) its membership in [trade 
associations]; (ii) the activities of the [trade associations], 
including those that Sherwin-Williams did not join, fund, or 
approve; (iii) Sherwin-Williams’ purported petitioning of 
federal, state and local governments; and (iv) Sherwin-
Williams’ commercial speech.” App. 49–50 ¶ 73. To support 
this claim, the company alleged it “has reconsidered and 
continues to question its membership in various trade 
organizations and its petitioning to the government on any 
issues.” App. 33 ¶ 14. And it claimed that the County’s 
potential lawsuit “impermissibly chills its speech and 
associational activities.” Id. 
In Count II, Sherwin-Williams sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief to preclude the County’s potential lawsuit. It 
claimed the County’s (unarticulated) public nuisance theory 
would seek to impose liability “(i) that is grossly 
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disproportionate; (ii) arbitrary; (iii) impermissibly retroactive; 
(iv) without fair notice; (v) impermissibly vague; and (vi) after 
an unexplainable, prejudicial and extraordinarily long delay, in 
violation of the Due Process Clause.” App. 52 ¶ 83.  
Finally, in Count III, the company alleged the County’s 
contingent-fee agreement (or possible future agreement) with 
outside counsel violates the Due Process Clause because “[t]he 
Constitution prohibits vesting the prosecutorial function in 
someone who has a financial interest in using the government’s 
police power to hold a defendant liable.” App. 56 ¶ 94. 
Sherwin-Williams asked for declaratory and injunctive relief 
before the County files suit because “once the[] lawsuit[] [is] 
filed, the Count[y’s] financial arrangement with trial attorneys 
will unlawfully interfere with [its] decision-making, including 
altering [its] positions or dissuading [it] from seeking 
appropriate resolutions to the alleged health hazards with 
which [it is] concerned.” App. 57 ¶ 96. 
Delaware County moved to dismiss the complaint and 
Sherwin-Williams moved for partial summary judgment on its 
due process claim related to the County’s agreement with 
outside counsel. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. County of Delaware, 
2019 WL 4917154, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2019). The District Court 
granted the County’s motion to dismiss, holding Sherwin-
Williams lacked Article III standing because its “complaint 
fail[ed] to state facts sufficient to show an actual case [or] 
controversy.” Sherwin-Williams Co., 2019 WL 4917154, at *4. 
The Court then denied Sherwin-Williams’s motion for partial 
summary judgment as moot. 
Because Sherwin-Williams sought only declaratory and 
injunctive relief, the District Court construed its claims as 
arising under the Declaratory Judgment Act and explained that 
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a “substantial controversy” must exist between the parties for 
a plaintiff to sustain a claim under the Act and Article III of the 
Constitution. Sherwin-Williams Co., 2019 WL 4917154, at *2. 
The Court observed that “[t]he entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint 
reads like a request for an advisory opinion regarding potential 
affirmative defenses to a state law case that has not yet been, 
and may never be, filed.” Id. at *4. It therefore concluded 
Sherwin-Williams failed to plead an injury in fact or a ripe case 
or controversy because the alleged harms hinged on the County 
actually filing suit. Id. at *3–4.  
Sherwin-Williams filed this timely appeal.1 
II 
Article III standing requires “(1) an injury-in-fact, (2) a 
sufficient causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will 
be redressed by a favorable decision.” Finkelman v. Nat’l 
Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2016). The 
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). The District 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction to determine its 
own jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 855 
F.3d 126, 142 (3d Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District Court’s orders. We review 
Rule 12(b)(1) dismissals de novo. Batchelor v. Rose Tree 




Court dismissed Sherwin-Williams’s complaint because the 
company failed to plead actual injury. We agree.2 
Injury in fact requires “the invasion of a concrete and 
particularized legally protected interest resulting in harm that 
is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 
Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 193 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). “A harm is ‘actual or imminent’ rather than 
‘conjectural or hypothetical’ where it is presently or actually 
occurring, or is sufficiently imminent. . . . [P]laintiffs relying 
on claims of imminent harm must demonstrate that they face a 
realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury from the conduct 
of which they complain.” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 
767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 
“Allegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the 
requirements of Art. III. A threatened injury must be ‘certainly 
impending’ to constitute injury in fact.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (citation omitted). And a party 
seeking equitable relief for a prospective injury, like Sherwin-
Williams here, must show a “likelihood of substantial and 
 
2 Sherwin-Williams argues the District Court’s order 
“cannot stand” based, in part, on two particular errors. 
Sherwin-Williams Br. 34. First, the District Court relied on the 
dissenting opinion in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 
U.S. 118 (2007), as if it were the majority opinion. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 2019 WL 4917154, at *4. Second, in addressing 
whether Sherwin-Williams had Article III standing, the Court 
erroneously relied on Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff 
Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952). In Wycoff Co., the Supreme Court 
addressed statutory federal question jurisdiction, not Article III 
standing. These errors do not require reversal because the 
District Court’s holding is well supported by applicable law. 
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immediate irreparable injury” to establish standing. O’Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974). 
Declaratory judgments are often forward-looking, but 
they are “limited to cases and controversies in the 
constitutional sense.” Wyatt, Virgin Islands, Inc. v. Gov’t of 
V.I., 385 F.3d 801, 805 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)). 
We may review only “concrete legal issues, presented in actual 
cases, not abstractions . . . . This is as true of declaratory 
judgments as any other field.” Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 
103, 108 (1969) (quoting United Public Workers of America 
(C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Sherwin-Williams asserts—and the County does not 
dispute—that it leveled a “facial” attack on the District Court’s 
jurisdiction. So “we accept [Sherwin-Williams’s] well-pleaded 
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences 
from those allegations in [its] favor.” In re Horizon Healthcare 
Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 
2017). Although a complaint need only be “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), it “must contain sufficient 
factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 




We first consider whether Sherwin-Williams 
established Article III standing by sufficiently pleading injury 
in fact.  
A 
In Counts I and II of its complaint, Sherwin-Williams 
failed to allege an existing injury or one that was “certainly 
impending” as a result of the anticipated litigation from 
Delaware County. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158. The 
company did not plead an existing First Amendment injury 
based on the County’s potential lawsuit because “generalized 
allegations” of chilled speech cannot establish an existing 
injury. See Pa. Family Inst. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 166 n.10 
(3d Cir. 2007). Instead, an allegation that certain conduct has 
(or will have) a chilling effect on one’s speech must claim a 
“specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future 
harm.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972). Sherwin-
Williams’s claim that the specter of the County’s potential 
lawsuit has caused it to “reconsider[] and . . . question its 
membership in various trade organizations and its petitioning 
to the government on any issues,” App. 33 ¶ 14, is a 
“generalized allegation[]” insufficient to satisfy Article III’s 
requirements. Pa. Family Inst., 489 F.3d at 166 n.10. 
Sherwin-Williams also claims it sufficiently alleged an 
imminent injury in Counts I and II based on a potential lawsuit 
by the County. But even if it could show that a lawsuit were 
certainly impending, it did not establish that such a lawsuit 
would cause a concrete injury to its constitutional rights. The 
company’s constitutional claims in Counts I and II rest on what 
it anticipates the County might allege in a hypothetical lawsuit. 
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Such speculation cannot satisfy Article III’s standing 
requirements. See Aetna Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. at 241 
(explaining federal courts may not issue “opinion[s] advising 
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts”). 
Specifically, Sherwin-Williams asks us to assume not only that 
the County will sue, but also its theory of liability, its litigation 
tactics, and that the County will prevail. App. 49–52, ¶¶ 73–
80. The County may proceed as Sherwin-Williams predicts. Or 
it may not. And who knows whether the County would win? 
That uncertainty—and all of the contingencies that go along 
with it—expose Sherwin-Williams’s inability to allege an 
existing injury or one that is “certainly impending.” See 
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155, 158. 
Moreover, Sherwin-Williams failed to show a 
“likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury” 
absent declaratory and injunctive relief. See O’Shea, 414 U.S. 
at 502. Any injury to Sherwin-Williams’s First Amendment or 
due process rights would not be irreparable. If the County sues, 
Sherwin-Williams can raise those claims as affirmative 
defenses in state court. See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of 
Columbus, 2008 WL 839788, at *3 (S.D. Ohio 2008). And the 
company failed to explain why such defenses would be 
inadequate. So any harm to its constitutional rights would be 
neither “substantial” nor “irreparable.” 
Sherwin-Williams’s preemptive suit differs 
significantly from another pre-enforcement case in which we 
found Article III standing. In Khodara Envt’l, Inc. v. Blakey, 
376 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2004), we considered whether a 
federal statute precluded development of a landfill. Instead of 
developing the landfill first and risking enforcement actions by 
the government, the plaintiff sought a judgment declaring its 
rights under federal law. We held that the plaintiff had standing 
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to pursue declaratory relief before the government took steps 
to block the landfill’s development because “it [was] apparent 
that it would [have been] inordinately expensive and 
impractical from a business standpoint” to force the plaintiff to 
act first and litigate later. Id. And it was undisputed that, if the 
plaintiff received a favorable ruling, it would develop the 
landfill. Id.  
Here, by contrast, Sherwin-Williams is not seeking 
clarification of its rights so it can take some affirmative 
business action, and any conduct for which Delaware County 
might sue has already occurred. Sherwin-Williams is instead 
trying to preempt the County’s supposedly imminent lawsuit 
with affirmative defenses it could raise in response to any suit 
that might be filed. And unlike the plaintiff in Blakey, Sherwin-
Williams has failed to show that defending against a lawsuit 
(rather than pursuing this one) would be “inordinately 
expensive and impractical.” Id. 
For these reasons, we hold that Sherwin-Williams lacks 
standing to pursue Counts I and II of its complaint. 
B 
Sherwin-Williams also failed to plead an existing or 
imminent injury sufficient to establish Article III standing for 
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its claim in Count III.3 There, the company claimed it suffered 
(and continues to suffer) an injury to its due process rights 
because the County formed a contingent-fee agreement with 
outside counsel. In particular, it claimed this arrangement 
“violate[s its] due process right to have a financially 
disinterested public official prosecuting a public nuisance suit 
brought on behalf of the public.” App. 56 ¶ 93. 
Because Delaware County did not execute its current 
agreement with outside counsel until more than a week after 
Sherwin-Williams filed its complaint, the company did not 
explain how the specific terms of that engagement letter 
infringe its due process rights. Instead, it assumed the County’s 
agreement would mirror other counties’ agreements and 
attached Lehigh County’s engagement letter to its complaint. 
That assumption turned out to be wrong—in its engagement 
letter, Delaware County “retain[ed] complete control over the 
course and conduct of the litigation.” See App. 226 (also 
explaining that the County has “real (not illusory) control over 
the litigation”). Sherwin-Williams cannot establish an existing 
injury based on that agreement’s specific terms. 
That leaves Sherwin-Williams’s argument that the 
contingent-fee arrangement will nonetheless cause some future 
injury by tainting an investigation and lawsuit by the County. 
 
3 The District Court did not specifically address whether 
Sherwin-Williams had standing to pursue this claim. The 
company argues this “requires reversal,” Sherwin-Williams 
Br. 18, but because this is a question of law we can resolve it 
in the first instance. See Wujick v. Dale & Dale, Inc., 43 F.3d 
790, 792–93 (3d Cir. 1994) (addressing, for the first time on 




The company alleged: “[O]nce these lawsuits are filed, the 
Counties’ financial arrangement with trial attorneys will 
unlawfully interfere with the Counties’ decision-making, 
including altering their positions or dissuading them from 
seeking appropriate resolutions to the alleged health hazards 
with which they are concerned.” App. 57 ¶ 96. The actual 
terms of the agreement with outside counsel belie this claim. 
Delaware County retained full control over potential litigation 
and does not stand to benefit from the contingent-fee 
arrangement, so Sherwin-Williams’s claims of impending 
injury were (and are) unfounded. It also argues its “rights can 
be protected only by determining” this issue before the County 
sues, id., but it fails to show an irreparable injury justifying pre-
suit relief. See O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 502. 
Like the company’s other claims, Count III assumes too 
much. Sherwin-Williams will suffer no harm if the County 
decides not to sue. And if it does sue, an injury may arise only 
if the County violates its own agreement and cedes control to 
outside counsel. That injury, if any, is neither existing nor 
certainly impending. So it cannot satisfy the requirements for 
Article III standing.  
IV 
 Even if Sherwin-Williams could satisfy Article III’s 
injury-in-fact requirement, its claims would not be ripe for 
review. “At its core, ripeness works ‘to determine whether a 
party has brought an action prematurely . . . and counsels 
abstention until such a time as a dispute is sufficiently concrete 
to satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of the 
doctrine.’” Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534, 
539 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Peachlum v. City of York, 333 F.3d 
429, 433 (3d Cir. 2003)). “A dispute is not ripe for judicial 
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determination if it rests upon contingent future events that may 
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Claims 
based merely upon assumed potential invasions of rights are 
not enough to warrant judicial intervention.” Wyatt, 385 F.3d 
at 806 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Sherwin-Williams insists its claims are ripe by citing 
our statement that a “party seeking declaratory relief need not 
wait until the harm has actually occurred to bring the action.” 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1154 (3d Cir. 
1995). But it ignores the requirement that a party “must 
demonstrate that the probability of that future event occurring 
is real and substantial, ‘of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’” Id. (quoting 
Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 192 
(3d Cir. 1990)). And it fails to overcome our holding that “[a] 
dispute is not ripe for judicial determination ‘if it rests upon 
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or 
indeed may not occur at all.’” Wyatt, 385 F.3d at 806 (quoting 
Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). Each of 
Sherwin-Williams’s claims fits that description.  
In Wyatt, we held an employer’s claims for declaratory 
relief against the government of the Virgin Islands were not 
ripe because, although the government issued cease-and-desist 
letters telling the employer to stop certain business practices 
and the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands issued an 
opinion letter declaring the case “ripe for injunctive and/or 
declaratory relief,” the government had taken no formal steps 
to proscribe the employer’s conduct. Id. at 803–04. Delaware 
County has taken even fewer steps than the government had 
taken in Wyatt. In fact, according to Sherwin-Williams’s 
complaint, the only action Delaware County has taken towards 
filing suit is hiring outside counsel. The County might sue 
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Sherwin-Williams, but it might not. It might advance the same 
arguments as other counties, but it might not. The uncertainty 
surrounding these fundamental questions renders these claims 
unfit for judicial resolution. Wyatt, 385 F.3d at 806.  
In short, Sherwin-Williams’s claims are not ripe largely 
for the same reasons they fail to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement—they require speculation about whether the 
County will sue and what claims it would raise. 
* * * 
 We agree with the District Court’s determination that 
Sherwin-Williams lacked Article III standing. The harms it 
alleges are hypothetical and conjectural. And any harm it may 
suffer as a result of a future lawsuit by Delaware County is 
redressable in the context of that case, should it ever occur. We 
will therefore affirm the orders of the District Court.4 
 
4 Because we will affirm the dismissal order, we will 
also affirm the order denying partial summary judgment as 
moot. 
